

**The Influence of NYĀYA-VAIŚEŚIKA Philosophy on ANUMITIVĀDA of
BHAṬṬAŚĀMKUKA**

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Abstract:

Four great exponents named Bhaṭṭalollaṭa, Bhaṭṭaśāmkuka, Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta and their respective theories named ‘*Utpattivāda*’, ‘*Anumitivāda*’, ‘*Bhuktivāda*’ and ‘*Abhivyaktivāda*’ on Bharata’s *rasasūtra* have marked a unique field of academic interest by their valued expositions flavoured with different theories of philosophy. The original doctrines of earlier interpreters could not be found till date, but they are introduced with their conclusions through various texts such as *Abhinavabhāratī*, *Kāvya prakāśa*, *Rasagangādhara*, *Dhvanyāloka-Locana* etc. Most of the interpretations are reconstructed from the citations and discussion of Abhinavagupta’s ‘*Abhinavabhāratī*’ and *Dhvanyāloka-Locana*.

As the abovementioned scholars are well aware of and connected to different schools of Indian philosophy, so without considering the philosophical elements in their thought, the ideas become detached from their foundations and thus become more difficult to understand. As Śāmkuka is the well known scholar of Nyāya School so his theory is highly influenced by the epistemology of Nyāya- philosophy (in broader sense Nyāya -*Vaiśeṣika*-philosophy) and he named it ‘*Anumitivāda*’ as this explanation finds affinity with the procedure of *anumiti* as depicted in the Nyāya philosophy. Secondly Śāmkuka mentioned that the knowledge named ‘*citraturaga-nyāyānusāriṇī pratīti*’ of *naṭa* is different from the famous four types of knowledge, namely *samyak-pratīti (pramā)*, *mithyā-pratīti (viparyaya)*, *samśaya-pratīti* and *sādrśya-pratīti (upamāna-jñāna)*. This idea is also influenced by the epistemology of Nyāya -*Vaiśeṣika*-philosophy.

Key words:

Bhaṭṭaśāmkuka, Bharata’s *rasasūtra*, interpretation, *Anumitivāda*, Nyāya -*Vaiśeṣika*-philosophy, *anumiti*, *citraturaga-nyāyānusāriṇī pratīti*, *samyak-pratīti (pramā)*, *mithyā-pratīti (viparyaya)*, *samśaya-pratīti*, *sādrśya-pratīti (upamāna-jñāna)*

Poetics and philosophy are two separate branches of study and each has its own field and scope but the theories of the philosophers have naturally put its impact on Indian poetics. In a natural course of influence, the philosophical contemplations began to be reflected on the poetics of ancient India which was a sequel to the essential nature of literary appreciation of poetics centred round ‘*raso vai sah*’, the central doctrine of the *Upaniṣads*. The ancient Indian seers, in fact recognized the blissful eternal entity to be the source of aesthetic enjoyment.

The present researcher is inclined to take up a field of study to find out the depth and the range of the impact of Nyāya-*Vaiśeṣika*-philosophy over the interpretation of Bhaṭṭaśāmkuka on Ācārya-Bharata’s *rasasūtra*. At the outset we would like to mention Bharata’s famous *rasasūtra*, “*vib-*

*hāvānubhāva-vyābhicāri-samyogādrasaniṣpattiḥ*¹⁹In this connection, it may be pointed out that Bharata kept his silence about the exact meaning of the words ‘*niṣpattiḥ*’ and ‘*sa myoga*’ mentioned in *rasasūtra* and even the relation among the factors *vibhāva*, *anubhāva*, *vyābhicāribhāva* and *sthāyibhāva*. This kind of silence on the part of Bharata, gave raise to various doctrines.

Four great exponents named Bhaṭṭalollaṭa, Bhaṭṭaśaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta and their respective theories named ‘*Utpattivāda*’, ‘*Anumitivāda*’, ‘*Bhuktivāda*’ and ‘*Abhivyaktivāda*’ on Bharata’s *rasasūtra* have marked a unique field of academic interest by their valued expositions flavoured with different theories of philosophy. The original doctrines of earlier interpreters could not be found till date, but they are introduced with their conclusions through various texts such as *Abhinavabhāratī*, *Kāvya prakāśa*, *Rasagangādhara*, *Dhvanyāloka-Locana* etc. Most of the interpretations are reconstructed from the citations and discussion of Abhinavagupta’s *Abhinavabhāratī* and *Dhvanyāloka-Locana*.

As the abovementioned scholars are well aware of and connected to different schools of Indian philosophy, so without considering the philosophical elements in their thought, the ideas become detached from their foundations and thus become more difficult to understand. The aim of this research is therefore, to re-evaluate the philosophical dimensions of his ideas more seriously, and to get a more nuanced and compact idea of this highly interesting aesthetic theory.

Among the Pre-Abhinavagupta commentators of Bharata’s *Nāṭyaśāstra* Śaṅkuka is known for his ‘*Anumitivāda*’ or ‘Inferential Theory’ about Aesthetic Emotion (*rasa*). According to the research of P.V. Kane, Śaṅkuka lived and worked during the period of 800 AD onwards (approximately). As Śaṅkuka is the well known scholar of Nyāya School so his theory is highly influenced by the epistemology of Nyāya- philosophy (in broader sense Nyāya -*Vaiśeṣika*-philosophy) and he named it ‘*Anumitivāda*’ as this explanation finds affinity with the procedure of *anumiti* as depicted in the Nyāya philosophy. Ācārya Śaṅkuka interpreted the famous *rasasūtra* in a different way. The main purpose of his interpretation is while apparently on the process of tasting *rasa* but herewith he discussed some ideas of philosophy in connection with the process.

His key argument is *sthāyibhāva* as imitation or emulation (*anukarāṇa*, *anukṛti*). No one can directly perceive the emotions, because they are in abstract forms. So the spectators ought to infer it. Therefore, the word ‘*niṣpatti*’ in *rasasūtra* should be interpreted as *anumiti*. The resultant cognition of such inference cannot be the real entity itself. The conjunction (*samyoga*) of *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyābhicāribhāvas* are referred to there is the inferential signs (*kāraṇasāmagrī*) and relationship among the aesthetic elements . Thus it is necessary to explain the procedure with a different point of view.

According to Śaṅkuka in the drama all the aesthetic elements such as, *vibhāvas* (the causes known as the factors), *anubhāvas* (the effects consisting of the reactions) and *vyābhicāribhāvas*

¹⁹Nagar .Rabishankar (ed.), *Nāṭyaśāstram of Bharata*, (with Commentary of Abhinavagupta’s *Abhinavabhāratī*). (Vol-1).Delhi: Parimal Publications, 1981, p. 271.

(the auxiliary causes namely transitory emotions) are totally dependent on the characters of drama. Again the *sthāyibhāva* (permanent mood) is also lying within them. So a dramatic persona is the possessor of *rasa* to come into being. But in reality these dramatic characters cannot come and perform on the stage themselves, so the spectators cannot perceive directly the exact emotional feelings lying in them. It is never ever possible that the spectator can relish the same feeling of the hero or heroine.

Thus it requires a suitable medium, who should be a normal person with some extra-ordinary quality. The quality is that he should have excellent acting skill. This person is known as the *naṭa*. With all his skills he emulates the dramatic character. The light, dress, make-up, sounds etc help him to portray his role in a living and attractive manner. He erases his personal identity at the time of acting. The acting flourishes with the efficiency of *naṭa*. Due to his perfect acting, the spectator feels that the *naṭa* is not different from the dramatic character.

Śāṅkuka clearly stated that the cognition derived by the imitation is different from the famous four types of knowledge namely real knowledge, false knowledge, doubtful knowledge and resembling knowledge. While apprehending any entity in general cognisors reach to one of four possible conclusions: such as ‘we have cognized the real entity’; ‘the entity we have cognized is proven to be false by some barrier knowledge’; ‘the cognition is uncertain’; or ‘we have only cognized something similar to known one’.

This type of knowledge that a spectator gets from a dramatic performance is not included within the aforementioned four types of knowledge. While watching the drama, ‘This man is the real hero’—this kind of *samyak-pratīti* or real knowledge is not here. ‘This man is not the hero’—this kind of unreal knowledge is also not here. ‘This man may be the hero or may not be the hero’—this kind of doubtful knowledge is not there. ‘This man is identical with the hero’—this kind of knowledge of similarity is also not present. Thus *Śāṅkuka* proved that the knowledge which came out from the acting of *naṭa* is different from the famous classifications of knowledge. He named this knowledge as *citraturaga-nyāyanusāriṇī pratīti*. None of the aforementioned four types of apprehension pertains to aesthetic cognition.

In ‘*Anumitivāda*’, the actor or *naṭa* is the *pakṣa* as per the definition ‘*sandigdha-sādhyavān pakṣaḥ*’, where the probandum (‘*sādhyā*’) ‘*mūlacaritānukaraṇarūpa-sthāyibhāva*’ is sought to be inferred on the basis of the triangular connection of *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *sancāribhāva*. ‘*Mūlacaritānukaraṇarūpavibhāvāditrayasamyoga*’ is the probans (*hetu*). Now following the *Nyāya* theory of inference; it can be explained in several steps:

1. The ‘*naṭa*’ is ‘*mūlacaritānukaraṇarūpa-vibhāvādivan*’. -(*pakṣadharmatājñānam*).
2. Wherever there is ‘*mūlacaritānukaraṇarūpa-vibhāvādivattvam*’ there is ‘*mūlacaritānukaraṇarūpa-sthāyibhāvavattvam, laukika-nāyaka-nāyikāvat*’ -(*vyāptijñānam, laukika-nara-nāribat*).
3. ‘*Naṭa*’ is ‘*mūlacaritānukaraṇarūpa-sthāyibhāva -vyāpya- mūlacaritānukaraṇarūpa-vibhāvādivān*.’ (*parāmarśajñānam*).

4. Therefore *naṭa* is ‘*mūlacaritānukaraṇarūpa-sthāyibhāvavān.*’ (*anumiti*).

In the context of dramas based on *Rāmāyaṇa*, ‘*Sītā*’ herself is the *ālamvana-vibhāva* of *Rāma*, The *naṭa* who acts as ‘*Rāma*’, is *pakṣa* (*mūla-Sītācaritānukṛtarūpa-ratimān*), and in this *pakṣa* the *mūla-Sītācaritānukaraṇarūpa-rati* can be inferred as *sādhyā* by the ‘*mūlacaritānukaraṇarūpa- vibhāvādītrayasamyoga*’ . Śaṅkuka justifies that as this knowledge leads to the expected result of *rasopobhoga* , so though the *rati* is emulated it cannot be termed as as ‘*ajathārthānubhava*’ . The spectators can infer this *rati* in *naṭa* and they can feel the aesthetic pleasure.

Vāmana jhalkikara explained it clearly in his ‘*Bālabodhinī*’ commentary as, ‘ *tadayam prayogaḥ- “ Ramo ’yam Sītāviṣayakarati mān Sītādyātmakavibhāvadisāmbandhitvāt Sītāviṣayakatākṣadimattvādvā jannaivam tannaivam jathā ’hamiti* ’. ²⁰

As this inference is not like a mundane apprehension so it is different from any other inference. It is a transcendental apprehension so the inference is stated as *alaukikānumāna* by Śaṅkuka. The opinion of Śaṅkuka is elucidated by Vāmana Jhalkikara in his ‘*Bālabodhinī*’ - “*etanmatasyāyam niṣkarṣaḥ , -jathā kujhatikākulite deśe ’sato ’pi dhūmasyābhimānāt dhūmaniyatasya vahneranumānam, tathā naṭenaiva sunipuṇam ’mamaivaite vibhāvādayaḥ’- iti prakāśitāistrāsadbhirapi vibhāvādibhistanīyatā ratiranumīyamānā ’pi nijasaundarjabalāt-sāmājikānām-āsvādyamānatayā camatkāramādadhātī rasatāmetīti rateranumitireva rasaniṣpattiriti- iti vivaraṇe spaṣtam.*” ²¹

Famous Four Types of Knowledge According To Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-philosophy:

Śaṅkuka mentioned that the knowledge named ‘*citraturaga-nyāyānusāriṇī pratīti*’ of *naṭa* is different from the famous four types of knowledge, namely *samyak-pratīti* (*pramā*), *mithyā-pratīti* (*viparyaya*) , *samśaya-pratīti* and *sādrśya-pratīti* (*upamāna-jñāna*).

Following Śaṅkuka the context may be explained. A painter paints a horse’s picture on a paper with the help of colour and brushes. With his painting skills the picture of horse neither differs from a real horse nor can it be referred as real horse. In this case the spectators do not have the realisation that ‘this horse is the real horse’. ‘This is not the horse’- this type of false knowledge does not occur. ‘Is it a real horse or not?’ This type of doubt does not step in the spectator’s mind. ‘This painted horse is similar to the real horse’- this type of thinking is also not present there.

While watching the lively painting of a horse the spectators can simply acknowledge that it is a painting of a horse, but it is not different from a real horse. Spectator’s experience of the actor in a play is like the experience of apprehension of a painted figure of horse. This is the key of the cognition established and defined by Śaṅkuka, similarly while watching a drama the spectators feel that the *naṭa* is not the real character, but he is not different from the character as portrayed

20 Mammaṭa, *Kāvya prakāśa*, (with *Bālabodhinī* Comm. of Jhalkikar). Delhi: Parimal Publications, 2008, p. 90

21 *Ibid*

in the drama. With this feeling the audience can totally concentrate their mind on the portrayal presented on the stage. So the theory of Śaṅkuka, echoed a theory of perfect mimesis that would be repeated down the ages and matches with the aesthetic objectives of Indian art.

S.k. de elucidated the idea of '*citraturaga-nyāyānusāriṇī pratīti*', " *This cognition or knowledge is characterised as being based on what is called citra-turaga-nyāya (or the analogy by which a horse in a picture is called a horse) and should be differentiated from the true ('he is Rāma '), the false ('he is Rāma ' with a following negation 'he is not Rāma '), the doubtful ('he may or may not be Rāma) knowledge , as well as from the knowledge of similarity ('he is like Rāma)* „²²

While dealing with the concept of cognition, different philosophers have analysed it from logical and metaphysical standpoints. The analysis of cognition from these different points of views give rise to different sorts of questions and problems. The logical analysis aims at determining the precise meaning of the concept of cognition, like, 'what is cognition?'

In the history of philosophy there is always been a contradiction regarding the term *jñāna*. To solve the problem various attempts have been made. But the philosophical traditions never agreed to a comprehensive definition of knowledge. A sincere analysis would reveal that in the epistemological consideration in Indian philosophy, there are primarily two senses of the word *jñāna*. One is restricted only to *pramā* or valid cognition. In this sense the cognition, regarding *samśaya*, *viparyaya* etc. are carefully restricted from the scope of knowledge. Another sense of cognition is all kind of knowledge including valid, non valid, re-collective, doubtful cognition etc all together.

In the *Nyāya* epistemology, cognition or *jñāna* is understood in a very wide sense, which includes and classified into two types both *smṛti* and *anubhava*. The *Nyāya* account of cognition started from Gautama (about 3rd century B.C.). AkṣapadaGautama, the author of the '*Nyāya-sūtra*' finds affinity among the terms –*buddhi* (cognition), *upalabdhi* (apprehension), and *jñāna* (knowledge)- '*buddhirupalabdhir jñānam hi anariliantaram*, — (*Nyāya-sūtra*, 1.1.15).

So *buddhi* and *jñāna* is the same thing, and stand for the wider sense of cognition or awareness or apprehension of object. Gautama considers *tattva-jñāna* is the highest desired goal of mankind. *tattva-jñāna* as that which leads to the attainment of the extreme welfare - '*tattvajñānat nihsreyasadhigamah*'—*Nyāya-sūtra*, 1.1.1.

The *tattva* or object of cognition is called *prameya*. The *prameya* or object of comprehension may be a quality or substance, an act or an emotion, the existent or the non-existent, commonness as well as particularity.

²²DE, S.K. *History of Sanskrit Poetics*. (vol 1). Calcutta: Firma K.L Mukhopadhyay, 1960, p.120

If we analyse the subjective part of the aforementioned divisions of cognition or *jñāna* then we can find that cognition is infallible in some cases and fallible in others. *Pramāṇas* are the instruments for distinguishing the valid cognition from invalid one or *apramā*.

According to *Nyāya* philosophy, *jñāna* is the quality or *guṇa*. Every *guṇa* (quality) remains in a substance through the relation, called inherence. According to *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophy cognition is an attribute or quality of the self; here the substance is self or *atman*. Thus Annambhaṭṭa defines the self as the '*jñānādhikaranamātmā*'. This definition abandons the conception of knowledge as an activity. Gopinath Bhattacharya translated it as "*The substrate (adhikaraṇa) of a conscious state (jñāna) is Soul (ātman)*".²³

Samyak- Pratīti:

In the *Nyāya* epistemology the *pramā* covers a specific area of *jñāna* or knowledge and *apramā* also covers a portion of '*jñāna*'. Hence all individual manifestations of knowledge are '*jñāna*', so to translate any type of *jñāna* as *pramā* is difficult because it can be misleading or confusing. There is a chance to over coverage the ideal paradigm. Both *pramā* and *apramā* are the quality of the self. That *jñāna* is described as *aguṇa* remaining in self is known through the instrument called '*pramāṇa*'. In *pramā* we perceive the valid cognition of particular object, whereas '*pramāṇa*' is like an instrument to acquire *pramā*.

According to *Nyāya* philosophy *samyak- pratīti* means *yathārthānubhava* or *pramā* which is defined as in *Tarkasaṃgraha*- "*tadvati tatprakāraḥ anubhavaḥ yathārthaḥ / saiva pramā ityucyate*".²⁴ Prof.V.N.Jha elucidated the idea as, "*A true experience is that which reflects the qualifier in its own locus*".²⁵

Śaṅkuka is of the opinion that the knowledge of expression that we get from the *naṭa* during a performance, which defines his indifference with the dramatic character, is fundamentally distinguished from the *samyak-pratīti* or true knowledge. According to *Nyāya* philosophy another term which is used to define *samyak-pratīti* is *yathārtha-anubhava*. When a connoisseur experiences that, '*naṭa* is not different with the dramatic character', the aforementioned definition of *samyak-pratīti* does not stand a chance here. Śaṅkuka mentioned it as, '*ayameva Rāma*' is a *samyak-pratīti* or valid cognition, which is not applicable in the case to know the actor who imitates the character named *Rāma*. While watching a play the connoisseur cognizes the actor as the emulation of the real *Rāma*. According to Śaṅkuka this kind of cognition is '*citra-turagan-yāyanusariṇī pratīti*'.

²³Bhattacharya, Gopinath (ed. with Eng. Trans and notes) *Tarkasaṃgraha-Dīpikā*: Annambhaṭṭa, Calcutta :Progressive Publishers, Second Revised Edition, 1983, p. 89 .

²⁴ Jha, V.N (Ed.with Eng Trans. And notes), *Tarkasaṃgrahaḥ of Annambhaṭṭa.Veliyanad Ernakulam*, Kerala :Chinmaya International Foundation Shodha Sansthan Adi Sankara Nilayam,2010.p. 46

²⁵ *Ibid*

While coming to the world of drama proper knowledge such as ‘*naṭa* is the actual *Rāma*’ cannot be apprehended. The main dramatic character has the main persona. That type of persona is not presented in *naṭa*. Though the connoisseur takes *naṭa* as not different to the main dramatic character to enjoy the taste of drama, he or she is aware about the fact that in reality *naṭa* can not be the main dramatic character. If we pursue ‘*tad*’ as ‘*Rāmatva*’, ‘*tadbati*’ means in the ‘*Rāmatvavan Rāma*’, ‘*tadprakāraka*’ means the features of *Rāmatva*. But we found the locus as within the *naṭa* who is not *Rāmatvavān*. Neither we perceive here ‘this is *naṭatvabati naṭatvaprakāraka naṭa*’ nor ‘this is *Rāmatvabati Rāmatvaprakārakah naṭa*’. The spectator knows ‘the *naṭa* is *mūlacaritānukaraṇarūpa-vibhāvādivan*’. So the ‘*naṭa* is *naṭatvabati naṭatvaprakārakah*’ is proper knowledge in respect of the actor’s self-identity but the ‘*naṭa* is *Rāmacaritānukaraṇarūpa-vibhāvādivan*’, cannot be stated as *yathārtha-anubhava* or *samyak-pratīti*. So ‘*jaḥ sukhī Rāmaḥ asāvayamiti*’ is not a case of valid cognition.

Mithyā-pratīti:

According to the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophy the theory of error is widely known as *viparyaya* or *anyathākhyāti*. The idea of erroneous knowledge starts from Gautama. In the *Nyāya-sūtra* there are references about wrong judgement. The term *anyathākhyāti* first occurs in Vācaspati's *Nyāya-vārttik-tātparyā-tīkā*, a glossary on Uddyotakāra's (635 AD) *vārttik* *Prāśastapāda*, in his *Bhāṣya* on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, distinguishes between *vidyā* and *avidyā*. *Vidyā* stands for valid knowledge. *Avidyā* is invalid knowledge which denotes the false error.

Gangeśa (about 1200 AD), the author of ‘*Tattva-cintāmaṇi*’ has explicitly mentioned the term *viparyaya*. Visvanātha said that the notion with regard to something that it has a particular attribute, which it has not, is described as non-valid or invalid cognition. Annambhaṭṭa in his *Tarkasamgraha* more or less, adheres to the classical account of *viparyaya*.

According to Annambhaṭṭa the definition of error is ‘*mithyājñanam viparyayaḥ*’²⁶. This simply means the false knowledge is *viparyaya*. To discuss the matter he executed the idea of an oyster-shell as silver. When a piece of silver coloured shell is lying before a perceiver he can misperceive it as a piece of silver. In *Tarkasamgraha-Dīpikā* Annambhaṭṭa explained it as ‘*tadbhāvavati tatprakārakaniścay ityarthah*’. This simply means an erroneous cognition, contains such characters (*rajatatva*) as attributes of the real object of cognition (*śukti*) which are in fact absent in it. *Viparyaya* is the second constituent of three type of non-valid cognition.

Dr. V.N.Jha elucidated the matter, “*When the property is seen occurring in a locus whereas in fact, there is absence of that property it becomes a case of error or mistake. It does not happen wilfully it simply happens due to a number of factors (either in the object of perception, or distance, or defects in the senses, or disturbance in the mind and so on)*”²⁷

26 *Ibid*, p. 99

27 *Ibid*, p.100

Śaṅkuka stated that while performing a drama based on *Rāma*'s life the *naṭa* improvises *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyabhicāribhāvas* of the character of *Rāma*. Thus the connoisseur knows 'the *naṭa* is not different from *Rāma*'. *Naṭa* is presented on the stage as (emulated) *Rāma* which is *citraturaga-nyāyānusāriṇī pratīti*. Śaṅkuka clearly refuted that this type of cognition may have a chance to be false or erroneous cognition. To clear this out his statement is written as, '*na cāpyayam na sukhīti*'. Erroneous knowledge does not have a scope here. This sentence is related (*anvita*) with the later conclusive sentence of Śaṅkuka. That is '*kimtu samyak-mithyā-samśaya-sadṛśya-pratītibhyo vilakṣaṇa -citraturagādinyāyena jaḥ sukhī Rāmaḥ asāvayamiti pratītiras-tīti*',²⁸

Here we can find two different perspectives of Śaṅkuka which leads to one final destination. First one is '*na cāpyayam na sukhīti*' which means 'the *naṭa* is not the happy/desiring *Rāma*'. The word *sukhī* (filled with desire) is the relating link to understand the context of *sṛngara rasa*. The real *Rāma* can only have such happiness as an attribute on the context of *rasa*. So *Rāma* is *dharmī* or substance who can be the only locus of the attribute happiness related to him. Thus according to Śaṅkuka, the premise '*na cāpyayam na sukhīti*' is indicating that it is a false knowledge which is not applicable here. Here '*ayam*' is that pronoun which denotes the noun *naṭa*. So the figure of speech would be like, 'the *naṭa* is not *Rāma*' which is a false knowledge or *mithyā- pratīti*. *Naṭa* is presented on the stage as (emulated) *Rāma*, so he is presented as 'not different from *Rāma* to spectators. After coming to the conclusion '*naṭa* is not different from *Rāma*, the connoisseur would not apprehend the judgement as 'this *naṭa* is not *Rāma*. As there is a barrier to the aforementioned knowledge so it seems to be a false knowledge or *mithyā-pratīti*. So '*na cāpyayam na sukhīti*' is not a case of an invalid cognition as the *naṭa* would be cognised as '*jaḥ sukhī Rāmaḥ asāvayamiti*', without any kind barrier knowledge.

Samśaya-pratīti:

'*Samśaya*' is an indecisive cognition of conflicting notions (*vimarśa*) regarding one particular object. According to *Tarkasaṅgraha*, the definition of doubt or *samśayajñāna* is-'*ekasmin dharmiṇi virūddha-nānā -dharmavaiśiṣṭyavagahi-jñānam 'samśayaḥ, yatha 'sthaṇurva puruso va iti*'.²⁹ Prof.V.N. Jha elucidated it as, "When two contradictory properties appear to share one locus it becomes a case of doubt"³⁰

Self –same entity means 'in the same locus' (*samānadhikaraṇa*). Regarding *samśaya* or doubtful cognition about any object, the object is apprehended but as the apprehension of the presence of incompatible diverse features in same locus. In reality incompatible characteristics however cannot be present within the self same entity. So the presence which is doubted is apparent. In the *Tarkasaṅgraha-Dīpikā* Annambhaṭṭa explained the importance of every term and phrases used in the definition. The first phrase is '*ekasmin dharmiṇi*' which means 'within the self-same entity'.

28 Nagar .Rabishankar (ed.), *Nāṭyaśāstram of Bharata, op.cit.*, p.272

29 Jha, V.N (Ed.with Eng Trans. And notes), *Tarkasaṅgrahaḥ of Annambhaṭṭa.Veliyanad Ernakulam, Kerala :Chinmaya International Foundation Shodha Sansthan Adi Sankara Nilayam,2010, p. 99*

30 *ibid*, p.100

This phrase is merely significant because without it the definition would be like, *samśaya* is that type of cognition of the presence of incompatible diverse characteristics’.

In doubtful knowledge the features (*koṭis*) Rāmahood and naṭahood would be the incompatible diverse characteristics. ‘Naṭa as *mulacaritrāmukaraṇarūpa-vibhāvādibiśiṣṭa*’, this knowledge is not the *samśayātmika pratīti*. The connoisseur does neither cater to the common features of *Rāma* nor does he conceive the common features of the *naṭa* who plays the character of *Rāma*.

According to Śaṅkuka *naṭa* emulated the *vibhāvas* of *Rāma*. It can be stated otherwise as a cognitive format in reference to the drama which is ‘*naṭa* is *mūlacaritānukaraṇarūpa-vibhāvādivan*’. According to Śaṅkuka this type of knowledge cannot be doubtful knowledge or ‘*samśayātmika pratīti*’. While watching a drama the spectator cannot have doubtful cognition like, ‘Is this *Rāma* or *naṭa*?’/ ‘he may be *Rāma* or may not be *Rāma*’/ ‘he may be *Rāma* or he may be a person different from *Rāma*’. Here he is equivalent to the actor and this pronoun theoretically implies the self-same entity.

It would be a case of *samśaya* if perceiving the drama; the audience would doubt the actor’s persona as *Rāma* or *naṭa*. In that case the cognitive state would be the state of 'doubt' or 'uncertainty'. It should be the cognition of the actor having the 'incompatible' (*virūddha*) features of the *Rāma* and the *naṭa*. In respect of this type of cognition the actor on the stage, would be the self same entity (*dharmī*) because he is the locus of cognition. The features (*koṭis*) Rāmahood and *naṭahood* would be the incompatible diverse characteristics. According to Prof.V.N. Jha- ‘When two contradictory properties appear to share one locus it becomes a case of doubt’³¹

This type of cognition is not possible due to the omission of the conditions which are necessary to have doubtful knowledge. *Rāma* is not a perceived character. He cannot be perceived by anyone in present era. S.K.DE explained it, ‘*Rāma* being a historical and mythological character cannot be cognised directly by the organs of sense belonging to the present.’³²

One certain object has certain feature. But if in that object with the previous certain knowledge some other kind of featuring knowledge of another object arises which is self contradictory then it is doubtful knowledge. The certain feature of *Rāma* is Rāmahood and the certain feature of *naṭa* is naṭahood. The actor is the entity who is marked as *dharmī*. *Rāma* and *naṭa* does not have any similar feature which can be cognised by anyone. So the first condition which is the apprehension of common characteristics between *Rāma* and *naṭa* therefore is never possible. At the theatre during the performance the visual senses of cognisor comes in contact with an actor but he simply cannot be able to perceive the common characteristics of both *Rāma* and *naṭa*. Therefore, there is no scope of doubt about the object before him: Is it *Rāma* or *naṭa* ? Due to the absence of this specific cause in such case a doubt or *samśayātmika pratīti* is not possible.

31 *Ibid*, p. 58

32DE, S.K. *History of Sanskrit Poetics: Complete Revised Edition In One Volume* . Firma K.L Mukhopadhyay , Calcutta,1960,p. 121

The second condition is the apprehension of the unique characteristic of the objects. Now this is clear that neither Rāma nor his unique characteristics can be apprehended through the sense organs. In the case of Rāma the unique characteristics or distinguishing marks are the kingship of Ayodhyā, son of Daśaratha, husband of Sīta, etc. Again in the case of *naṭa*, the unique characteristics or distinguishing marks are the proficiency in acting. The spectator can acknowledge the unique characteristics or distinguishing marks of *naṭa*, but not of Rāma. Due to the absence of the similar and unique characteristics of Rāma, it is impossible to cognize the incompatible or contradictory features between Rāma and the *naṭa*.

So ‘*mūlacaritānukaraṇarūpa-vibhāvādivan*’, this knowledge is not a *abhāvakotika-jñāna*. The spectator cannot have the features of Rāma and does not find any similarity in between Rāma and *naṭa*. Thus the knowledge of indifference between the perception of *naṭa* and the perception of the characters of a drama is not driven by knowledge of doubt. This is because the connoisseur neither caters to the common features of Rāma and nor does he conceive the common features of the *naṭa* who plays the character of Rāma. So ‘*jaḥ sukhī Rāmaḥ asāvayamiti*’ is not a case of a doubtful cognition.

Sādrśya-pratīti:

According to the *Nyāya* School, third kind of veridical apprehension is *upamiti* and its means or *karana* is called *upamāna*. Structurally *upamāna* is constituted by an *upasarga* (prefix), *dhatuprakṛti* (a verbal root) and *pratyaya* (suffix). So the etymological constituents of *upamāna* are *upa* prefix- *mat* verbal root+*lyut* suffix. *Upa* prefix denotes to *sādrśya* or similarity and *māna* meaning knowledge. Therefore the *upamāna* derivatively stands for the apprehension of the similarity. The term *upamāna* has been used as comparison, analogy, similarity, resemblance, etc. by different scholars.

In *Tarkasamgraha* Annambhaṭṭa defines ‘*upamāna*’ as, ‘*upamiti-karaṇam upamānam*’³³ which means *upamāna* is the ‘special cause’ for the emergence of the cognition known as ‘*upamiti*’.

Then he clears the concept of *upamiti* as ‘*samjñā-samjñi-sambandhajñānam upamiti*’.³⁴ That means *upamiti* is the apprehension of the relation between a name (*samjñā*) and ‘what it signifies’ (*samjñī*). So it is simply the ‘*bācya-bācaka-sambandha*’. *Upamāna* is the cognition of similarity that induces the apprehension of the relation between a name (*samjñā*) and ‘what it signifies’ (*samjñī*). So *upamāna* is the *karana* or means of *upamiti*. The bison is similar to a wild cow; here cognition of similarity is the known knowledge which leads to the unknown knowledge. The knowledge of similarity is the source of knowledge of relation either between a name and an object or between word and its denotation.

33 Jha, V.N (Ed.with Eng Trans. And notes), *Tarkasamgrahaḥ of Annambhaṭṭa.op.cit.*, p.91

34 *Ibid* ,p.91

Again he elucidated ‘*tatkaraṇam sādṛśyajñānam*’. So *sādṛśyajñāna* is considered as the means of the *upamiti*. Here the word ‘*tat*’ refers to *upamiti*, so the means of *upamiti* is *sādṛśyajñāna* ‘knowledge of similarity’ (*sādṛśyajñāna*) which is named as *upamāna*.

Upamāna is the knowledge of similarity which is the source of knowledge of relation either between a name (*saṃjñā*) and an object (*saṃjñī*) or between a word and its denotation. In this type of *sādṛśyajñāna* the role of *atideśavākya* is crucial as ‘*gosadrśo gavayaḥ*’.

Here for the emergence of *sādṛśyajñāna* the *atideśavākya* should be presented as ‘*naṭa* is similar to *Rāma*’. But this type of *atideśavākya* is not available in the texts. Even the features of *Rāma*-hood and *naṭa*-hood would be incompatible diverse characteristics. So the spectator cannot have cognition that “*na cāpi tatsadrśa iti*”.

In daily life, one may obtain many bits of information just by comparing certain things and events. But in case of aesthetic apprehension it is different. While watching a drama based on *Rāma* we acknowledge particular actors and actresses as not different to the real characters of *Rāmāyana*, through the ‘*citraturaga-nyāyānusāriṇī pratīti*’ (as the cognition of the emulation of a horse which is treated as a horse by spectator). Firstly emulation and similarity are two different apprehensions. Both have their own field of study. Emulation is match or surpass or reproduction (a person or achievement), typically by imitation. It can be a person, function, action. Whereas similarity is resemblance. There may be some characteristics in common: strictly comparable. Secondly while watching the drama the actor or ‘*naṭa*’ who plays the character of *Rāma* we acknowledge him as not different to *Rāma*. We do not recall *Rāma* in this case. Here the comparison or analogy by which we gain knowledge of a thing from its similarity to another thing is not possible. This type of cognition is not possible due to the omission of the conditions which are necessary to have knowledge. *Rāma* is not a perceived character. He cannot be perceived by anyone in present era.

If it the *sādṛśyajñāna* then it is in the format of *upamiti*. According to *Nyāya*, it is definite knowledge of the object sought to be definitely known through its similarity with an object already well known. In this case it should be as the cognition of the relation of a name here *Rāma* (*saṃjñā*) with the person (actor/*naṭa*) presented before the spectators as emulated *Rāma* (*saṃjñī*), e.g. in the given case, the cognition that ‘*naṭa*’ which is found to resemble *Rāma* is called ‘emulated *Rāma*’. It cannot be produced by the knowledge of similarity because a man recognizes a

wild cow as a 'gavaya' he remembers the description that 'a gavaya is an animal similar to a cow' but a man recognizes the *naṭa* as 'emulated *Rāma*'. He cannot remember the authoritative description that 'emulated *Rāma* is the '*naṭa*' similar to '*Rāma*'. Because the knowledge that we have of the similarity of the recalled person to the previously seen person. That scope is absent here.

As such, *upamāna* involves the following steps- (a) A person hears an authoritative statement from a authoritative person, e.g. 'x is similar to y', (b) Somewhere he observes similarity of x with y. (c) He remembers the authoritative statement and its meaning, (d) He concludes by comparison that this kind of object is denoted by the word 'y'. The cognition of similarity thus emergence *upamiti* and thus cognition of similarity is important instrument. So in this type of *sādrśyajñāna* the role of *atideśavākya* is crucial. To emergence of *sādrśyajñāna* the *atideśavākya* should be presented as *naṭa* is similar to *Rāma*. After hearing or reading the proposition, spectator goes to the theatre to watch dramatic performance and would acquire the knowledge of the relation between the naming word and the object. Then one can perceive similarity between the two personalities and have the cognition of similarity. But this type of *atideśavākya* is not available in the texts. So the spectator cannot have cognition that *naṭa* is similar to *Rāma*. So '*jaḥ sukhī Rāmaḥ asāvayamiti*' is not a case of *sādrśya-pratīti*.

From the abovementioned discussion it is reflected that as Bhaṭṭaśaṅkuka is well aware of and connected to different theories of *Nyāya -Vaiśeṣika* philosophy, so with considering the philosophical elements in his thought, the ideas become firmed from their foundations and thus become easier to understand.

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